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NOTES AND COMMENTS
by a deed of trust, it held that an estate by the entirety did not exist in
those bonds since they were personalty and no estates by the entirety
existed in personalty in North Carolina. It seems that this Court is
willing to say that money received from the sale of the realty is held
by the entireties while bonds thus received are not so held. It is doubt-
ful if any satisfactory distinction can be made, since both are person-
alty and a bond "smacks" more of the realty than does money especially
where the bond is secured by a deed of trust.
The Court in the principal case, clinging to the view that estates
by the entireties exist in money received from the sale of realty so held,
and intent on preserving the integrity of such estates, goes further and
holds that a trust is set up in favor of the widow for the whole amount.
Trusts, other than those expressly created by the parties, are usually
declared by the courts (1) where an intent that one should arise is pre-
sumably inferable from the conduct of the parties, or (2) to prevent
a wrongful enrichment.27 It is suggested that in the present case a
trust cannot be predicated on either of these two grounds. By holding
that a trust exists the Court is giving the widow a preferred claim
against the estate where the fund was dissipated through no fault of the
husband or his administratrix. This result would work a hardship on
the husband's bona fide creditors if the husband's estate should be found
to be insolvent, since the widow's preferred claim would have to be
settled in full before the creditors could receive anything.
A better result would have been reached by holding that the widow
was a mere creditor of the estate to one half the amount. This would
have carried out the probable intention of the parties as to a division
of the fund. At the same time it would have obviated, as to the money,
any further consideration of the undesirable legal consequences flowing
from an estate by the entirety.
ROBERT BOOTH.
Sales-Passing Title to Part of Fungible Goods-What
Constitutes Fungible Property.
The defendant company had stored in different warehouses 513,517
bags of beet sugar, each of the same standard and weight. During the
year 1917 the defendant entered contracts for the sale of 190,374 bags,
on which no payment was made before 1918, and which were not set
apart from the other bags nor delivered until 1918. The Federal income
tax upon the proceeds of these sales was computed as upon funds ac-
cruing in the fiscal year 1917. In 1925 on the contention that title did
not pass to the vendees until delivery in 1918, and hence that the tax
I Bo(mET, TRusTs (lst. ed. 1921) 92; MArLAND, EpuiTy (1st. ed. 1920) 73.
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should be levied upon the proceeds as accruing in that year, the com-
missioner of internal revenue levied against the defendant a deficiency
tax of $210,000 for the year 1918. On appeal the decision of the com-
missioner was repudiated, the court holding that the tax was correctly
levied for the year 1917, on the grounds that (a) the beet sugar in bags
was fungible property, and (b) that title to the bags sold passed imme-
diately without segregation, since that was the intention of the parties.'
The court takes the position that the fact that the sugar "was stored
in different warehouses used in the operation of the (vendor's) busi-
ness did not render inapplicable the ordinary rules respecting the sale
and passage of title to a part of fungible property without separation,"
since the parcels "were all a part of a common stock."
It is familiar law that unascertained chattels cannot be the subject
of sales, because otherwise the parties would not know what had been
bought and sold ;2 hence the attempted sale of a part of a mass presents
the problem of what constitutes a sufficient identification. Generally
the contract for the sale of goods from bulk is executory, and no title
passes until the subject matter has been identified by segregation of the
items to be sold.3 This is universally true where the units of the mass
differ in value, quality, or state, unless the parties agree to regard the
items as being alike.4 But in connection with the doctrine of fungible
goods, applicable to merchandise the units of which are the same in
value, quality, and state, even when the parties intend the immediate
passage of title, there is a clear split of authority along three lines: (1)
No title passes before separation. 5 (2) Title passes upon execution of
the contract for sale, regardless of separation. 6  (3) Title passes at
once, creating a tenancy in common, which the parties may sever at will
by demanding their respective shares.7
'United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 72 Fed. (2d) 755 (C. C. A., 10th,
1934).
'United States v. Woodruff, 89 U. S. 180, 22 L. ed. 863 (1874); Kellog v.
Frohlich, 139 Mich. 180, 102 N. W. 1057 (1905); Blakely v. Patrick, 67 N. C.
40, 12 Am. Rep. 600 (1872).
'McFadden v. Henderson, 128 Ala. 221, 29 So. 640 (1901) ; Keeler v. Goodwin,
111 Mass. 490 (1873).
"Stamford Extract Mfg. Co. v. Oakes Mfg. Co., 9 F. (2nd) 301 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1925) ; Yoder v. Parcell, 189 N. E. 517 (Ind., 1934).
"Cook & Laurie Contracting Co. v. Bell, 177 Ala. 618, 59 So. 273 (1912);
American Factors v. Goss, 72 Cal. App. 742, 238 Pac. 121 (1925) ; S. Breakstom
Co. v. Gen. Parts Corp., 87 Ind. App. 55, 160 N. E. 47 (1928) ; Scudder v. Worster,
11 Cush. 573 (Mass., 1853) (the leading case on this view).
' Conboy v. Petty, 60 Ill. App. 117, (1894) ; Ark. River Gas Co. v. Molk, 130
Kan. 30, 285 Pac. 561 (1930) ; Kimberly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec.
334 (1859) (the leading case on this view); Juno v. Northern Elevator Co.,
56 N. D. 223,216 N. W. 562 (1924); Geoghegen v. Arbuckle Bros, 139 Va. 92,
123 S. E. 387 (1924).
" Chapman v. Shepherd, 39 Conn. 413 (1872); National Exchange Bank
v. Wilder, 34 Minn. 149, 24 N. W. 699 (1889); Merchants Bank v. Hibbard,
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Rule (1) is based on the contention that regardless of whether the
units of a mass be exactly alike or distinguishable, in either case, the
precise thing to be sold cannot be identified as the subject of the sale if
not taken out of the bulk.8 Rule (2) rests upon the ground that the
impossibility of distinguishing between the units of fungible merchan-
dise renders it impracticable to set aside the vendee's goods before he
calls for them; and that the subject of the sale is sufficiently ascertained
by the designation of the quantity and the mass from which it is to be
taken.9 Rule (3) is founded upon a compromise which admits that
before segregation title to precise goods cannot pass, but which holds
that title to an undivided interest in the whole passes at once, thus carry-
ing out the intention of the parties through the device of a cotenancy. 10
This is really a sound method of reaching the desirable result of the sec-
ond rule.
Formerly the tendency of authority in England was toward the sec-
ond rule, while in the United States it was toward the first."1 Today
the situations are reversed, the English courts following the first rule,
and the trend in this country being toward the second and third rules.'2
This fact is due largely to differences between provisions in the Eng-
lish Sale of Goods Act and in the United States Uniform Sales Act, the
adoption of which by over half the states explains why most courts in
this country repudiate the first rule.13
48 Mich. 118, 11 N. W. 834 (1882) ; (It has been held that the tenant in common
may bring replevin for his share: Halsey v. Simmons, 85 Ore. 324, 166 Pac. 944
(1908); Manti City Savings Banks v. Peterson, 33 Utah 209, 93 Pac. 566);
MARI.ASH, SALEs, (1930) §78 ("It would seem that as the goods are not specified,
title would not pass,. . . but the parties intend to transfer title to something.
Therefore it is held that the buyer becomes owner in common with the seller.") ;
1 WiLLis oN, SALEs, (2nd ed. 1924) §150, §156, §157 ("In regard to a tenancy
in common of goods which are fungibles, there is a right of severance by either
party").
s See cases upra cited under note (5).
'Kingman v. Holmquist 36 Kan. 735, 14 Pac. 168 (1887) ; Barber v. Andrews,
29 R. I. 51, 69 Atl. 1. (1908) ; See cases cited supra in note (6).
" Hurff v. Hires, 40 N. J. L. 581, 29 Am. Rep. 282; O'Keefe v. Leistikow, 14
N. D. 355, 104 N. W. 515 (1905); Cases and treatises cited supra note (7);
WAITE, SALEs, (1921) 64.
1 Scudder v. Worster, 11 cush 573 (Mass., 1853) (Holding separation neces-
sary to Pass Title) ; Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East 614 (K. B. 1810) (Separation
held not necessary to passing of title.
"Stems v. Vickers [1923] 1 K. B. 78 (Separation held essential) ; 1 WILLIs-
TON, SALES (2nd ed. 1924) §148 (To the effect that in England before separation
the sale of a part of fungibles passes no title in severalty nor creates a tenancy
in common) ; material cited supra notes (6), (7), and (10) for the prevailing
view in this country.
English SALE OF GOODs Acr §16 ("Where there is a contract for the sale
of unascertained goods no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer
unless and until the goods are ascertained"). United States UNIFoRm SALEs Acr
§17 ("Where there is a contract to sell unascertained goods, no property in the
goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained,
but property in an undivided share of ascertained goods may be transferred as
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Determination of what goods are included in the term "fungible
merchandise" involves consideration of requirements both as to (a) the
units and (b) the mass they compose. The units must be not only prac-
tically identical, but also in mercantile usage each one must be regarded
as the equivalent of the other ;14 or, if the items are not the same, the
parties can treat them as being alike by agreement. 15 Once the require-
ments as to the iinits are satisfied, there must be a common mass or bulk
composed of those units; there is such a common mass either when the
units are commingled, or when the parties agree to regard the different
constituents, even though widely separated, as parts of a common
supply.16 Hence in the instant case, the reasoning of the court to the
effect that all the goods, though in different warehouses, were brought
into a common mass by the terms of the contracts for sale seems sound.
As illustrative of the above rules: (a) Clearly liquids, cotton, hay,
grains, and fruits, of like standard and condition, commingled in huge
depositories, are fungible goods.. 7 (b) The same is usually true when
such merchandise is put up in boxes, barrels, sacks, or bales, though
not always.' 8 But automobiles, even though of the same make, model,
style, and price, are not fungible goods, because in mercantile practice
one of such cars is not treated as the equivalent of any other of them ;19
in the light of the fact that such units are of the same value, quality, and
state, it is believed that this distinction is arbitrary, and that automobiles
should be treated as fungibles without special agreement. Of course
by agreement even units of varying kind and quality, as sheep or cattle,
may be deemed fungible property.20
JOE. L. CARLTON.
provided in section six") id. §6 ("If the parties intend to effect a present sale,
the buyer, by force of the agreement, becomes an owner in common with the
owners of the remaining shares." The remainder of the section makes this
specifically applicable to fungible goods). MARIAsHr, SALES (1930) 753 (List-
ing states that have adopted the UNIFORM SALES Acr). North Carolina has not
adopted the act, and there seem to be no cases directly in point with the principal
case from this state.
" UNIFORM SALES AcT §76 (1) ("Fungible goods means goods of which
any unit is from its nature or by mercantile usage treated as the equivalent of any
other unit) ; Cases cited supra notes (6) and (7).
1Watts v. Hendry, 13 Fla. 523, (1870); Woodward v. Edmunds, 20 Utah
118, 57 Pac. 848 (1899) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALSS (2nd ed. 1924) §159.
"See: Jennings-Haywood-Oil Synod v. IHaussiere-Latreille Oil Co., 127,
La. 971, 54 So. 318; Henderson Grain Co., v. Russ, 122 Tex. 620, 64 S. W. (2d)
347 (1933) ; Trejbal v. Packhard Farmers Warehouse Co., 124 Wash. 638, 215
Pac. 26 (1923).
"'Cases cited supra under notes (5), (6), and (7); Any suggestion of the
characteristic of selection in the place of that or mere weight or measure pre-
cludes the possibility of fungible goods: Lamprey v. Sargent, 58 N. H. 241 (1878),
where hard brick were to be selected from a quantity of brick.
's See 1 WILLISTOIT, SALEs (2nd ed. 1924) §159.
"oSee MARIAsr, SALES (1930) §77.
'Cases and treatise cited supra note (15).
